

THE 2004 HAND-IN-HAND RALLY IN TAIWAN: “TRAUMATIC” MEMORY,  
COMMEMORATION AND IDENTITY FORMATION

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*This article investigates how a collective memory of trauma was produced in the course of commemorating the 2-28 Incident in the context of the 2004 election campaign, and how this memory production led to the parallel formation of a Taiwanese national identity. The 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally was designed to remember the 2-28 Incident as an historical trauma in order to be forgotten. The remembering of the 2-28 Incident must be regarded as a constructive process as opposed to a retrieval process. The memory of the 2-28 Incident was selectively constituted in favor of sovereign power.*

INTRODUCTION

Since 1990, Taiwan has experienced a discursive proliferation on the subject of Taiwanese identity. People in Taiwan from all walks of life have been enthusiastic and passionate in talking about it. “Taiwanese” has been articulated as a national identity in this wave of discursive activity, produced largely through its differentiation from “Chinese.” Statements concerning Taiwanese national identity, whether made in terms of history, culture or population, all attempt to (re)narrate the past, (re)excavate memories and (re)interpret history with regards to the (trans)formation of the Taiwanese nation. Indeed, the past, or the memory of the past, is one of the key grammars of identity formation.<sup>1</sup>

Notably, this discursive proliferation coincides with Taiwan’s process of democratization. Such a level of discussion has been made possible in part through the gradual enactment of the democratic principle of freedom of expression. Accompanying

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process of commemoration? How has this commemoration discursively contributed to building up people's self-identification as Taiwanese, and what characterizes this national self-identification?

This article argues that Taiwanese identity exists only in discourse. Taiwanese identity is a way of talking and acting relative to what sort of people the Taiwanese are. All statements and conducts related to "the Taiwanese" and "Taiwanese-ness" constitute "Taiwanese" as an identity. Moreover, this process of construction is not simply one way. A particular discourse of "Taiwanese-ness," in turn, makes certain statements and types of conduct possible, conditioning what people say and do. In this regard, "Taiwanese-ness" is neither naturally given nor premeditated, but exists in the way people talk and act. At the same time, however, it is integral to other things people say and do and is in turn sustained or undermined by these things. Taiwanese identity is therefore a *practice* that belongs to the realm of discourse and is determined, sustained, undermined or transformed by various practices that are, in turn, discursive. This article is an examination of a type of social practice amid the wave of discursive proliferation that incited people to talk about "Taiwanese-ness" in relation to an event of Taiwan's traumatic past, the 2-28 Incident.

Methodologically, the following pages seek to provide a "thick description" of the rally. "Thick description" here refers to a methodology that sets an event, in this case the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally, within its historical and political context; by examining a multitude of significant details, the event is revealed as a "meaningful event." The term "thick description," elaborated by Clifford Geertz, reflects the assumption that human behavior cannot just be explained through abstract analysis but instead demands researchers to consider its social context.<sup>4</sup> David Cannadine argues further that political rituals cannot be interpreted merely in terms of their interior structure; in order to discover the meaning of a ritual, "it is necessary to relate it to the specific social, political, economic and cultural milieu within which it was actually performed."<sup>5</sup> Analogously, locating an event in a context is "not merely to provide the historical background, but actually to begin the process of interpretation."<sup>6</sup> More radically, one can argue that locating an event within different contexts leads to a variety of differing interpretations of the event. Contextualizing an event thus becomes *political*.<sup>7</sup>

Officials demanded that people hand over weapons or face prosecution. People were jailed and executed without due legal process, accused of conspiring with Chinese communists. Many Taiwanese died during the incident; most estimates range between 10,000 and 20,000.<sup>8</sup>

It is noteworthy that the incident has been narrated, remembered, and interpreted differently across various historical times and political contexts.<sup>9</sup> The incident, when it first happened, was officially defined in Taiwan as a Chinese communist conspiracy. The KMT blamed it on Taiwanese communist agitators who had received Japanese military training. During the 1949-1987 martial law period, public discussion of the incident was considered seditious in Taiwan. The history of the 2-28 Incident became political taboo, as if it had never happened. By contrast, among overseas advocates of Taiwanese independence, the 2-28 Incident was figured as an icon of Taiwanese nationalism against the KMT. The armed uprising initiated by the Taiwanese people was regarded as a resistance against the KMT's oppression over the Taiwanese, and "a violent struggle for the national independence of Taiwan Movement."<sup>10</sup> Moreover, since Chiang's KMT regime was conceived as a Mainlanders' regime, the 2-28 Incident was then interpreted and remembered as an ethnic confrontation between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders.

Beginning in 1987, Taiwan's political liberalization signified a new stage in the competition for the interpretation and remembrance of the 2-28 Incident. During the process of democratization, the precise meaning of 2-28 has continued to change. Under the presidency of Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui), the KMT reversed its former policy of denying the incident's existence and decided to address the question of the 2-28 Incident; in 1995, Lee offered an official apology and full rehabilitation to all 2-28 victims. While this acquiescence was mainly due to the mounting pressure of public opinion, it was also in the interest of Lee's indigenous faction of the KMT. It was an opportunity to distance Lee from the KMT's authoritarian past and depict the KMT under his leadership as a new democratic, indigenized and Taiwanized party, fit to compete in a democratic society. The incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou (Ma Yingjiu) of the KMT has maintained Lee's position on the 2-28 Incident; he too has apologized, admitting that ordinary people were forced to rebel in response to bureaucratic misgovernment.<sup>11</sup> For the Democratic

cultural context in which we are situated when we recall that event. Halbwachs first dismisses the idea that the past is preserved within individual memories; instead, every individual memory is socially constructed as a product of collective and social frameworks. As Halbwachs puts it, “it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memory.”<sup>23</sup> Moreover, for Halbwachs, memories of the past are affected by the mental images an individual employs to solve present problems. He asserts that collective memory is always selectively reconstructed in accordance with a social group’s “present needs.”<sup>24</sup> Hence, the past is not preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the present. It might then follow that only those recollections that are in accordance with present needs can exist.

Halbwachs’ insights into the social construction of collective memories have had a significant impact on the contemporary scholarly boom in memory studies. Many link memory to the construction of the idea of the nation. Pierre Nora, for example, has focused on *lieux de memoir* (or “realms of memory”) in his discussion of the codification, condensing and anchoring of national memory.<sup>25</sup> According to Nora, “there is no spontaneous memory;” rather, “we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize celebrations, pronounce eulogies, and notarize bills because such activities no longer occur naturally.”<sup>26</sup> The *lieux de memoir* – museums, archives, cemeteries, festivals, anniversaries, etc. – generalize, manifest, decree or sustain our lost memory, thus functioning as embodiments of an imagined national past. They are illusions of the eternity and continuity of the nation-state. National memory is, above all, “archival,” “relying entirely on the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the image.”<sup>27</sup> Nora’s arguments offer an insight into the various forms of collectively remembering the national past.

The aforementioned scholarly literature has been important to recent studies on remembering the 2-28 Incident and the formation of Taiwanese national identity. Scholars have explored the development of the idea of Taiwan through discourses of trauma and a collective memory of 2-28 through their analyses of various memorial texts, icons, and monuments.<sup>28</sup> What has been absent in the studies of commemorative practices of the 2-28 Incident, however, is an examination of political and electoral campaign

Taiwan's sovereign status within the international system. The most widely acknowledged manifestation of this identity conflict is the battling between two political coalitions over the years, the Pan-Green Coalition and the Pan-Blue Coalition. Pan-Green Coalition voters tend to call for a Taiwanese national identity distinct from the Chinese, and push for formal independence if possible. In contrast, supporters of the Pan-Blue Coalition are inclined to view the Taiwanese as Chinese, opposing anything that seems like a move towards independence. In such a political atmosphere, the nature of the 2004 election as a zero-sum national identity battle had perhaps been predetermined.

These issues of identity had previously been articulated in Taiwan's election campaigns, especially since the 1990s. From early on, when the DPP was an opposition party, its leaders built up their electoral support by highlighting the shared sense of suffering and deprivation among the native Taiwanese, mainly Minnan-speaking people, the ethnic majority in Taiwan. DPP politicians perceived "Taiwanese consciousness" in terms of ethnicity as the ultimate weapon with which to unite non-KMT supporters of different social groups under this shared ethnicity.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, there was also a danger of overplaying the ethnic tone. One complication is that after decades of social integration it is nearly impossible to exclude Mainlanders, politically and culturally, in the pursuit of nation-state building in Taiwan. A further problem is posed by the existence of other ethnic minorities among the native Taiwanese, namely, the Hakka and the Aborigines. As pointed out by Juan Linz, in a society in which various ethnic groups are living together, building a nation-state solely on primordial characteristics is too costly.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, most nationalists are eventually forced to put more emphasis on territoriality. However, as Linz reminds us, nationalists may still persist with primordialism to a certain degree, given the fact that the absolute territorial definition would endanger their claims since this "dilutes the distinctiveness of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, national identity."<sup>32</sup>

The case of Taiwan's 2004 presidential election bears out Linz's argument. Instead of focusing on ethnicity, the Pan-Green Coalition's election campaign stressed the desirability of establishing a Taiwanese territorial identity distinct from that of the Chinese. It therefore became expedient to make the People's Republic of China (PRC) an issue of contention. President Chen duly ramped up his criticism of the PRC, drawing

the government to include the concept of “Taiwanese-ness” in school textbooks so future generations would develop a uniform identification. They also called on authorities to replace designations of “China” and “Chinese” with “Taiwan” and “Taiwanese” at all levels of governmental agencies, embassies, and state-run enterprises. In addition, they appealed to the government to disallow and remove the use of “China” from the titles of all civic organizations and private companies registered or incorporated in Taiwan. The organizers of the movement also arranged to hold the same rally annually until these goals were achieved.

In 2003, the parade to rectify the name of Taiwan, which had originally been designed to take place on 11 May again, was postponed until 6 September due to the outbreak of SARS. Despite this delay the parade proved a success, attracting more than 150,000 participants. The organizers subsequently planned to hold another 500,000-strong demonstration on Mother’s Day 2004. However, when the alliance’s co-conveners reported to the former President Lee Teng-hui,<sup>37</sup> Lee reacted by saying that the 2004 presidential election, due to take place 11 days after Mother’s Day, would be the most important battle in the fight to safeguard the native regime, and that only after this had taken place could they smoothly push forward a campaign to change Taiwan’s official name. Lee insisted that the main task for the Pan-Green Coalition was to think of a way to integrate their resources and strengths to help DPP candidate Chen in the 2004 presidential election.<sup>38</sup>

On 31 Oct. 2003, the “Hand-in-Hand to Safeguard Taiwan Alliance” was established, composed of the DPP, the TSU, the 5-11 Alliance to Campaign for Rectifying the Name of Taiwan, and various other pro-independence organizations. Former President Lee was appointed General Chairman, while the then-DPP Deputy Secretary Lee Ying-yuan (Li Yingyuan) became the chief event planner. The event date was set very quickly for 28 Feb. 2004. To the organizers, it was the perfect date: not only a public holiday, but also the 57<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 2-28 Incident.

THE 2-28 HAND-IN-HAND RALLY, 2004

Changlung Road in Pingtung County on the southern tip of the island. The Chinese characters for *Hoping* and *Changlung* literally mean “peace” and “prosperity,” and thus this route signified the road from peace to prosperity. It should be mentioned, however, that the original plan of the route was designed to terminate at Chienkuo Road in Pingtung City; the Chinese character *Chienkuo* means “nation-building.” This proposal was later abandoned as too controversial and as having the potential to deter more moderate people from joining the campaign.<sup>41</sup> Details of the routes were organized by locally coordinated groups in each city and county, and were designed to cross the most densely populated areas. This was in order both to facilitate the participation of greater numbers of people and to promote President Chen as part of his election campaign.

On the day of the rally, all those who had signed up to take part were designated check-in points where they assembled at 11:00 a.m. Those who had not signed up were allowed to join the line at any point along the designated route. The organizers encouraged participants to bring three gadgets with them: cell phones, digital cameras and radios. The cell phones were used to spread text messages about the event, while the digital cameras were used to keep photographic records. The organizers urged people to send their pictures of the event to the rally’s website in order to share the information with people around the world. Information regarding the rally was also broadcast on the radio.

The highlight of the event was in Miaoli County, the central part of Taiwan, where the National Rally Headquarters was located. President Chen and former President Lee planned to hold hands there as a symbol of their concerted efforts to protect Taiwan and to promote democracy. The choice of Miaoli County for the main stage of the event was not made without conscious decision. It was noted that Miaoli County is a remote, mountainous and Hakka-populated area. The Hakka community has long been regarded as a loyal supporter of the KMT. Linking the human chain continuously without a break in Miaoli became the most difficult organizational task of the event. The organizers therefore decided to make this area the focal point, aiming to mobilize more participants in this region.<sup>42</sup> The organizers used a large number of buses to transport participants from other counties to this area. A high turnout in this area was not only imperative for the success of the rally, but also, and more importantly, vital to Chen’s election

politicians. In Taipei County, ten women and girls, with ages ranging from just a few months to 105 years, came to the rally with Vice President Lu, a woman, to express solidarity. Taiwan's major religious groups also turned out to support the event. The Taiwanese Presbyterian Church marked the day with prayers for the nation in Taipei County. Among the throngs of participants in the northern city of Miaoli were around 1,000 people, each carrying a statue of Buddha in their arms, praying for the blessings of the gods on Taiwan. The then-Premier Yu Shyi-Kun beat a peace gong provided by a Taoist Temple in Tatsoon Township, Chunghua County, the midpoint of the 500 km-long human chain.

Despite lingering memories of the tragedy of 2-28, the event proceeded more like a festival, taking on a carnival atmosphere with musicians and dancers performing on open stages. Many participants were dressed in costumes or brought elaborately made props and banners with them to create a festive atmosphere and play down the political overtones of the event. Each area demonstrated its own local specialties. In Chunghua, for example, a county that earned its reputation for being at the heart of the nation's flower trade, around 100,000 participants gathered, many of them carrying chrysanthemums. There were also many traditional Taiwanese folk art performances staged along the route of the rally to add to the fun. At Hopping Island, aborigines performed traditional dances. A spectacular lion dance was performed on the old Xiluo Bridge in Chunghua. Rock concerts played for the rest of the afternoon. Finally, a night rally was organized at Pingtung's Oluanpi Lighthouse, on the southernmost tip of Taiwan, to mark the end of the event.

In addition, the organizers released the logo and theme song for the rally. The logo for the campaign was designed as an image of Taiwan held up in a hand, the five fingers representing the five major ethnic groups of Taiwan – Hakka, Mainlander, Minnan, Aborigines and their foreign spouses – coming together to protect their nation. The theme song, entitled “She is Our Baby,” was not originally written for the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally, but was composed in 1993 for a charity that helped young girls who had suffered from domestic violence, sexual abuse and exploitation, designed to raise social awareness of child prostitution and to support the rescue of child prostitutes in Taiwan.<sup>43</sup> The lyrics of this song are as follows:<sup>44</sup>



poor state of the economy or corruption, failed to define the campaign. Second, it helped Chen occupy the moral high ground. The core strategy was to identify the rally with support for Chen, and then to attempt to associate this pair with concepts such as loving Taiwan, the expression of the will of the people and democracy. The Pan-Blue Coalition candidates were positioned as opponents of these concepts. Third, it helped raise the *esprit de corps* of the Pan-Green Coalition during the election campaign. The rally boosted the spirit of the Pan-Green Coalition and its supporters. The large number of people taking part not only consolidated the Pan-Green Coalition's traditional support base, but also boosted Chen's electoral prospects, since the event likely had an effect on the orientation of undecided voters. In short, the Pan-Green Coalition created an environment in favor of its own interests during the election campaign by commemorating the traumatic history of the 2-28 Incident.

#### SOVEREIGN POWER IN COMMEMORATING THE TRAUMATIC EVENT

As this article has shown, the 2-28 Incident was used in the 2004 Hand-in-Hand Rally as a warning against unification with mainland China, a symbol of the reconciliation of different ethnic groups, and above all, a symbol of autonomous Taiwanese nationhood and statehood.

According to the rally's organizers, one of the main reasons for the uprising and its brutal suppression by the KMT was the fact that in 1947 Taiwan and China were divided by a deep cultural, political and economic rift, which led to friction after the KMT took over the island, finally culminating in the 2-28 Incident. The accepted contemporary narrative is that the rift now runs even deeper than in 1947, especially since Taiwan has become a democratic country while the PRC has held on to its single-party rule. If Taiwan were forced to agree to a renewed unification with China, a second 2-28 Incident would inevitably follow; thus it is crucial that the tragedies of 2-28 are not forgotten. According to the proponents of the rally, the only way to avoid the repetition of this traumatic history was to safeguard Taiwan's sovereignty by adopting the following two guidelines.

To some advocates, people who “turn their backs on China” came together on this historic day of sorrow and transformed it into a day of hope for peace and freedom in the future.

Indeed, to the rally’s proponents, it was time for national reconciliation, for getting beyond the traumatic memories of the past and for moving forwards to a bright future: let there be no more ethnic divisions. The wounds caused by the 2-28 Incident, which had for a long time caused deep hostility and suspicion between the different ethnic groups in Taiwan, could now be healed into mutual understanding and solidarity. Through acts of forgiveness and reconciliation, the memory of 2-28 could be used as a resource to create renewed strength and unity and safeguard Taiwan’s sovereignty. It is useful to juxtapose this narrative with that which the DPP upheld while it was still an opposition party before 2000. At this time the 2-28 Incident was interpreted as a legitimate resistance inspired by an emerging consciousness of Taiwanese-ness under KMT rule, and an inevitable consequence of the collision that took place between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders.<sup>49</sup>

Interestingly, the rhetoric employed in 2004 by the rally organizers, who were affiliated with the DPP government (or Pan-Green Coalition), is indistinguishable from that used by the KMT under Lee in the 1990s and Ma Ying-jeou since 2008. As Edmondson and Chen have shown respectively, the official rhetoric regarding the 2-28 Incident formulated by the KMT government in the 1990s also emphasized ethnic harmony, and the need to move on and look to the future rather than pick at scars of the past.<sup>50</sup> The official text inscribed in 1997 during Lee’s presidency on the 2-28 Monument in Taipei illustrates this idea of the post-2-28 ethnically and politically harmonious utopia. It states:

[After] the lifting of martial law in 1987 ... the head of the state made a public apology, victims and their families were compensated, and a memorial to the incident was erected ... *From this day forth, let us unite as one with mutual trust, treating one another with love and sincerity*

linear time frame. Therefore, contends Edkins, the forms of statehood “are themselves produced and reproduced through practices of trauma and memory.”<sup>55</sup> As a result, the sovereign power must both reveal and conceal the trauma it produces. In this way, intense remembering often becomes intentional forgetting.

Edkins here provides an instructive theoretical insight that helps us think through the nature of the 2-28 commemoration in 2004. As demonstrated above, the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally was designed to produce a harmonious post-2-28 political utopia: a new Taiwanese nation. Such rhetoric, however, reveals the contradictory nature of the process of remembering the 2-28 Incident, by manifesting two necessary elements in the process of nation building. First, the 2-28 Incident must be commemorated as a trauma in order to differentiate Taiwan from China. Second, it is also necessary to forget 2-28 in order to form a united and harmonious Taiwanese nation. Commemorating the 2-28 Incident in 2004, in terms of both remembering and forgetting, conceals a troubling issue: the violence of the sovereign state against its citizens. The 2-28 Incident serves a variety of agendas, one of which is a narrative of national awakening. The problematic aspect of the rally is that it was instigated and led by the sovereign power. The rally should not, therefore, be perceived as resistance against sovereign power, but rather as another concealed form of state violence towards its citizens, which is enacted through the creation of a narrative of a coherent national identity and an oppressive national unity. The 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally constitutes a situation in which the sovereign state inserts meaning into a traumatic event by imposing a specific reading of the past and silencing alternatives.

One example of silencing alternatives is the DPP government’s refusal in 2006 to grant an entry visa to the production crew of a joint venture company with funds from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, which applied to shoot scenes in Taiwan for the film *Cloud Water Ballad*. The film is based on a screenplay by Zhang Kehui, a Taiwanese expatriate who moved to China in 1948 at the age of 20 and went on to become the vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (1998-2008). Set against the backdrop of the 2-28 Incident, the film tells the story of a poor Taiwanese left-wing college student and a girl from an affluent family in Taipei between the late

In short, the sovereign power manipulates, by any means necessary, the collective memory of traumatic events it has perpetrated in order to consolidate its own legitimacy. Sovereign powers require the maintenance of national and moral unity amongst their subjects in order to sustain the power of their own sovereignty. Traumatic events, therefore, need to be remembered but also forgotten.

## CONCLUSION

Drawing from memory studies theorists, especially Halbwachs' elaborations of the social construction of memory in the light of present needs, and Edkins' studies about the role of sovereign power in the production of traumatic memory, this article has investigated how a collective memory of trauma was produced in the course of commemorating the 2-28 Incident in the context of the 2004 election campaign, and how this memory production led to the parallel formation of a Taiwanese national identity. The 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally was designed to remember the 2-28 Incident as an historical trauma in order to be forgotten. The remembering of the 2-28 Incident must be regarded as a constructive process as opposed to a retrieval process. The memory of the 2-28 Incident was selectively constituted in favor of sovereign power.

It is important to acknowledge that the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally is just one of the many commemorative practices that have conjointly contributed to the emergence of a particular way of remembering the 2-28 Incident. The commemorative means through which the 2-28 Incident is being remembered are recurring practices, rather than one-off events. This article explored only one representative event involved, intending to delineate the process that created a specific memorization of the incident. The analysis undertaken in this article is both causal and non-causal. It is causal in the sense that the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally contributed to the memory of the 2-28 Incident with specific attributes attached to it. It is non-causal in that the construction of 2-28 memory cannot be deduced, either fully or partly, from this event. The article is both a meticulous and a selective study of the memory of the 2-28 Incident. It is meticulous in its detailed description of the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally. It is selective in that the commemoration

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 15.

<sup>2</sup> “Mainlanders” is the term by which the native Taiwanese labeled those ethnic Chinese who settled in Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT regime after 1945. Native Taiwanese refers to the people whose ancestors were from southern China and immigrated to Taiwan from the seventeenth century up to Japanese colonization in 1895.

<sup>3</sup> The role demonstrations, performances and rituals play in the production and reproduction of national identity has been widely studied. See special issue of *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 12(1): 1-226 (2012).

<sup>4</sup> Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (London: Fontana, 1973).

<sup>5</sup> David Cannadine, “The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the ‘Invention of Tradition,’ c. 1820-1977,” in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 105.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> In contrast to the conventional use of the term “politics,” which refers to politics taking place in parliaments, political parties and governments, the *political*, from a poststructuralist perspective as elaborated by Laclau, signifies a “power to definition.” See Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (London: Verso, 1990), 31-36.

<sup>8</sup> Tse-han Lai, Ramon H. Myers, and Wou Wei, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).

<sup>9</sup> Robert Edmondson, “The February 28 Incident and National Identity,” in Stephane Corcuff, ed. *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 25-46; Steve Phillips, “Fighting over Peace Memorial Day: Politicians and February 28 Commemoration,” *Triangle East Asia Colloquium*, Duke University (2006), [http://www.duke.edu/APSI/events/TEAC/2005\\_2006/phillips\\_paper.pdf](http://www.duke.edu/APSI/events/TEAC/2005_2006/phillips_paper.pdf) (accessed 24 Aug. 2012); Stefen Fleischauer, “The 228 Incident and the Taiwan Independence Movement’s Construction of a Taiwanese Identity,” *China Information* 21: 373-401 (2007).

<sup>10</sup> Fleischauer, “Taiwan Independence Movement,” 5.

<sup>11</sup> China Times, “President Ma apologizes for 228 Incident,” Taiwan Today (2010), <http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=95132&CtNode=414> (accessed 24 Aug. 2012).

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Olwen Bedford and Kwang-kuo Hwang, *Taiwanese Identity and Democracy: The Social Psychology of Taiwan's 2004 Elections* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

<sup>30</sup> Chu, "Year of Stress," 85.

<sup>31</sup> Juan J. Linz, "From Primordialism to Nationalism," in Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, eds. *New Nationalisms of the Developed West* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), 203-53.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 250.

<sup>33</sup> Bedford and Hwang, *Taiwanese Identity and Democracy*, 30.

<sup>34</sup> Previously the central government under the KMT regime was largely dominated by Mainlanders.

<sup>35</sup> Mattlin, "Zaoshi."

<sup>36</sup> The other important one is Taiwan's first-ever referendum, which was held on the same day as the presidential election. See Mily Ming-Tzu Kao, "The Referendum Phenomenon in Taiwan: Solidification of Taiwan Consciousness," *Asian Survey* 44(4): 591-613 (2004).

<sup>37</sup> Since leaving the KMT in 2000, Lee has played an active role in Taiwan's independence movement.

<sup>38</sup> Interview with the rally organizers in Taipei, 17 Aug. 2006.

<sup>39</sup> *Taipei Times*, 29 Feb. 2004, 1.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Interview with the rally organizers in Taipei, 21 July 2006.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> Chen, "Beyond Commemoration," 149.

<sup>44</sup> The English translation is taken from Chen, "Beyond Commemoration," 148.

<sup>45</sup> Chen, "Beyond Commemoration," 148.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Taipei Times*, 1 March 2004, 8. Emphasis added.

<sup>49</sup> A-chin Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism* (London: Routledge), 167.

<sup>50</sup> Edmondson, "The February 28 Incident;" Chen, "Beyond Commemoration."

<sup>51</sup> Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, xv.